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Spring was in the air at State U., and so too was the spirit of
creativity among State U.'s professors.1 Mechanical engineering pro-
fessor A created a better mousetrap out of her custom-made Kevlar-
boron composite material. History professor B finished a book about
modem American culture titled How Gilligan's Island, Not the Brady
Bunch, Better Reflects America. Computer science professor C com-
pleted a computer program that would choose a person's ideal mate
based on that person's favorite frozen dinners.
In terms of capitalizing on these creations,2 there are large dispar-
ities among A, B, and C. Assuming A's mousetrap is patentable,
3
State U. owns all rights in it. A gets a cut of the potential profits but
* J.D. Candidate, 1996; B.S., University of California, Berkeley, 1993. I thank Than
Luu, Erin Connors Morton, Francine Swink, and Sheryl Wolcott for their comments on
earlier versions of this Note. In addition, I thank my parents, Ravi and Anjalie Kulkarni,
and my sister, Madhur Kulkarni, for always being there when I needed them, even when I
didn't know that I needed them.
1. Cf Richard Hovey, Spring, in TiE HoME BOOK OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONs 393
(Bruce Bohle ed., 1967):
Spring in the world!
And all things are new!
2. Throughout this Note, "creations" is used as a blanket term encompassing patent-
able inventions and copyrightable works. See U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, INTELLECr-AL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECrRONICS AND INFOR-
MAION 127-28 (1986) (defining "creators" as "scholars, poets, writers, artists, inventors,
and others who produce intellectual works"). "Creations" also includes technological
know-how not handled by patent or copyright regimes, but this Note does not focus on
such creations. See infra note 10 for a discussion of "technological know-how."
3. Receiving patent protection is often an arduous task. See Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966) ("He who seeks to build a better mousetrap today has a long
path to tread before reaching the Patent Office.").
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will have little say in determining how best to market the mousetrap. 4
B owns all rights in the book.5 If the book becomes a bestseller, B
keeps all the royalties; State U. gets nothing because most universities
do not claim rights in copyrightable works.6 C also owns all rights in
his program because the predominant form of intellectual property
("IP")7 protection for computer programs is copyright.8
Is there a reason for the disparity in treatment among A, B, and
C? Why is A compensated less for creating with her hands while B,
who creates with a pen, is compensated more? Note an anomaly: even
though both A's and C's creations are utilitarian "technical" creations,
only C owns all IP rights in his work. The facile answer is that the
university IP policy to which these professors consented prescribes
this differing treatment. But that begs the real question: Why do uni-
versity IP policies treat different types of faculty creations differently?
The answer to this question is important because faculty creations
significantly boost the American economy. American universities
spend large amounts of money in pure and applied research.9 All of
this research produces a staggering number of inventions10 and copy-
4. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
6. See id.
7. Throughout this Note, "intellectual property" ("IP") is treated as having only two
components: patents and copyrights. Additional forms of IP exist, including trade secrets
and trademarks. Trade secret law might serve as the best substitute for patent protection.
However, patents and trade secrets are very different. Patentable inventions require nov-
elty, nonobviousness, and originality. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988). Additionally, patents
are designed for public disclosure. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 10-13 (1988). By contrast, any process,
system, or device used in business to achieve a competitive edge is eligible for trade secret
protection, provided that secrecy is maintained. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757
cmt. b (1939). For a good summary of how trade secret law might be used by professors to
protect their creations, see Pat Shockley, The Availability of "Trade Secret" Protection for
University Research, 20 J.C. & U.L. 309 (1994).
8. Historically this has been true. See THORNE D. HARRIS III, THE LEGAL GUIDE TO
COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON COPYRIGHTS, TRADE-
MARKS, PUBLISHING, AND TRADE SECRETS 42 (1985). However, over the last twenty years,
more and more computer programs are receiving patent protection, at least when attached
to a "process" that patent laws recognize. See L.J. KUTTEN, COMPUTER SOFrWARE: PRO-
TECTION, LIABILITY, LAW, AND FORMS § 3.03[11], at 158 (1987).
9. In 1989, American universities spent $13.9 billion on academic research: 68% on
basic research, 25% on applied research, and 6% on development research. See Pat K.
Chew, Faculty-Generated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg?, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 259,
307 (citing NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 108
(1989)).
10. In this context, "inventions" also includes technological know-how which may not
qualify for patent protection but is still useful in manufacturing or in some other way.
"Know-how" is defined as "a fund of technical knowledge and experience acquired by an
enterprise in the use and application of an industrial technique." J.H. Reichman, Overlap-
ping Proprietary Rights in University-Generated Research Products: The Case of Computer
Programs, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 51, 89 n.192 (1992) [hereinafter Reichman, Over-
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rightable works, both of which dramatically enhance America's pro-
ductivity.11 Therefore, any change in the current university IP regime
that would increase creation would benefit society at large.
This Note proposes that this differing treatment is not justified.
This Note proposes a fundamental change in the disposition of intel-
lectual property rights in the university context, namely that profes-
sors, whether they specialize in technical subjects or liberal arts,12
should own all IP rights in their creations.' 3 This Note develops three
main reasons for this position. First, all creations by university faculty
should be valued equally because no genre of creation is intrinsically
better than another,' 4 and this equal valuation should be reflected in
equality of treatment between technical and liberal arts professors.
Second, if professors are allowed to own their patentable inventions
outright, they will have an additional incentive to create socially useful
lapping Rights] (quoting 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED
RIGHTs-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 321-24 (1975)).
11. See eg., J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs As Applied Scientific Know-How:
Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L.
REv. 63,9, 644 (1989) [hereinafter Reichman, Applied Know-Howl (noting that patenting
results of university research contributes to the "nationwide drive for greater competitive-
ness on international markets"); Don Colburn, Uneasy Partners in Discovery As Universi-
ties Warily Welcome Industry Dollars: Can Research Remain Pure?, WASH. POST, Apr. 23,
1986, at Z10 (explaining how the "cutting-edge research of today's labs has the potential
for immediate application"); Julia F. Siler et al., Million-Dollar Professors: Should the
Ivory Tower Be a Gold Mine?, Bus. Wx., Aug. 21, 1989, at 90 (discussing how two Univer-
sity of Chicago business school professors' interest in nonlinear programming led to the
start of Investment Research, a company that helps pension funds invest their assets).
12. In this Note, "technical" encompasses engineering, life sciences, the so-called
"hard" sciences, computer science, and other programs with a primary focus on or use of
technology and natural phenomena. "Liberal arts," by contrast, covers fields with a focus
on human activities, behavior, and institutions, such as history, sociology, and English.
Because of the nature of their research, technical professors are much more likely to
create patentable inventions than are liberal arts professors. By contrast, both technical
and liberal arts professors produce copyrightable works-scholarly articles, textbooks, and
books aimed at the general public.
13. This Note uses the following phrases interchangeably: "control over one's crea-
tion," "ownership of a creation," and "ownership of IP rights in a creation." Granted, own-
ership of IP rights can be distinct from owning a physical manifestation of the creation. See
17 U.S.C. § 202 (1988) (copyright); 1 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS
§ 1.05, at 1-20 (2d ed. 1989) (patent). However, before the creator assigns her creation to
someone else, she controls the creation, owns the creation, and owns any potential IP
rights in the creation.
14. This is not to say that publication in the SmalIville Law Review is equivalent to
crafting a delivery mechanism for an AIDS vaccine. Within each genre of creation, a hier-
archy of prestige and value exists. But ranking the genres themselves on a worthiness scale
seems to go against a university's purpose, which is to encourage learning of all types, free
of external pressures and valuations of worth. See DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY
TOWER: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 18-20, 26 (1982); infra
text accompanying note 161.
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inventions.15 This is consistent with the economic thrust of American
IP law' 6 and the evolving role of universities in conducting more mar-
ket-oriented research. 17 Third, allowing professors to own the IP
rights in their creations serves as "soft compensation," which will help
to attract and retain faculty.'8 Rising costs and shrinking government
support translate into meager pay hikes or even pay cuts for profes-
sors, especially at public universities.' 9 The incentive of exclusive IP
rights for these professors might reduce the attraction of industry
positions.20
These changes may cost universities some guaranteed royalty rev-
enue because professors can license their creations on their own and
give nothing back to the university. However, retooled university
technology transfer offices, which will handle the marketing of cre-
ations and the collecting of royalties from professors' creations, will
compete favorably with the private sector to market professors' cre-
ations. Coupled with the additional number of creations that will be
produced under this regime, universities may in fact receive more
overall royalty revenue.21
Part I of this Note discusses how IP rights are allocated between
the university and the professor in the absence of specific contractual
terms. These default rules give ownership of all creations (patentable
inventions or copyrightable works) to the professor. Part II discusses
the variety of contractual approaches taken by universities to circum-
vent this common law and ensure their ownership of the IP rights in
faculty creations. Part II also discusses the reasons why universities
claim IP rights; some are moral, others are pragmatic. Part III estab-
lishes the normative case for faculty ownership of all IP rights in their
creations. The reasons why universities claim IP rights are critiqued
15. See Chew, supra note 9, at 283-84 (noting the high number of patents awarded to
universities adopting this approach); Reichman, Overlapping Rights, supra note 10, at 59-
60; infra text accompanying notes 174-79 (telling the story of Stephen Wolfram).
16. The primary purpose of American intellectual property (IP) law is to encourage
production of new creations. See JEREMY PHILLIPS & ALISON FIRTH, INTRODUCTION TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 22 (2d ed. 1990). Since society desires this production, it
gives a monopoly to the creator. In other words, American IP law is incentive-based. Id.
Thus, giving incentives to create, such as full faculty ownership, fits in with the grand
scheme of American IP law. European IP law, on the other hand, grants rights in intellec-
tual property because the creation was made from the sweat, toil, and inspiration of the
creator. Id.
17. See Reichman, Applied Know-How, supra note 11, at 643-46.
18. Chew, supra note 9, at 283-84.
19. See, e.g., Larry Gordon, UC Plans to Hike Fees, Slice Pay 5%, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
13, 1993, at Al, A23 (discussing a "temporary" 5% pay cut for faculty and staff).
20. This incentive is especially important to retain technical professors, who usually
have more employment opportunities in the private sector than do liberal arts professors.
See infra Part III.B.2.
21. See infra Parts III.A.3, IV.
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here as well. Finally, Part IV presents the details of this Note's propo-
sal that professors, not universities, own the IP fights in faculty cre-
ations. Part IV also refutes the concern that professors will spurn
university technology transfer offices en masse in favor of other
options.
I. The Default Rules for Ownership Rights in Faculty
Creations
University IP policies are essentially contractual mechanisms for
modifying the default rules that govern ownership rights in faculty
creations. 22 This Part explains that the default rule for copyrightable
works is that the professor owns the copyright in her work.23 Similarly,
the default rule for patentable inventions is that the professor owns all
patent rights in her invention.24
A. Copyright
To qualify for copyright protection, a work must meet two re-
quirements: it must be original25 and it must be fixed in tangible
form.26 As these requirements are easily met in most cases, copyrights,
unlike patents, are relatively easy to obtain.27 A wide variety of works
can be copyrighted, including computer programs2 and industrial de-
signs29 as well as the traditional grist for the copyright mill: books, art,
plays, and musical compositions.
30
22. Universities are no different than other industrial employers in requiring their
employees to sign agreements modifying the rights to ownership of their creations. Most
employers require their employees to sign such agreements. See Steven Cherensky, Com-
ment, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agree-
ments, Property, and Personhood, 81 CAl.. L. REv. 595, 599 (1993).
23. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). The originality requirement is very easy to satisfy;
"even a'slight amount [of originality] will suffice." Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
27. Reichman, Overlapping Rights, supra note 10, at 73. On the relative difficulty of
obtaining a patent, see infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
28. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONMMSSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL
UsEs ("CONTU") OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 12-16 (1979); 17 U.S.C. § 101 para. 41 (1994)
(reflecting CONTU recommendations by adding a definition of "computer program" to
§ 101).
29. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (allowing copyright of works of art
that also have some utilitarian function); 17 U.S.C. § 101 para. 36 (1994) (defining these
"useful articles"); 17 U.S.C. § 113 (1994) (responding to Mazer by acknowledging limited
copyrights in designs for useful articles).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
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A copyright generally vests in the "author" of the particular
work.31 In most cases, the creator of the work is also the "author.
'32
However, American copyright law does recognize an alternative basis
for authorship in certain cases, based on who commissioned the work.
This alternative basis for ownership comes from the economic founda-
tion of American copyright law.33 If a work is a "work for hire," then
the hiring party (the employer) is considered the author and owns the
copyright.34 Section 101 of the Copyright Act has two definitions of
"work for hire," but the most relevant definition in the university con-
text is "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment. '35 Thus, if an "employee" creates a work within the
scope of her employment, the employer, not the employee, is the
"author."
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,36 the United
States Supreme Court interpreted "employee" in light of common law
31. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994).
32. The "author" must conceive of the copyrightable expression and authorize fixa-
tion in tangible form (or fix it herself). Andrien v. South Ocean County Chamber of Com-
merce, 927 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir. 1991). Under this definition, "author" and "creator" are
the same.
33. American copyright law, like other American intellectual property regimes, is
more concerned with protecting economic rights than protecting personal rights, unlike
European IP law. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir.
1976); supra note 16. The clearest example of the differing philosophies between the Amer-
ican and European approaches is with regard to the moral rights doctrine. This doctrine
gives the artist the right of attribution and also the right to prevent any modifications to the
work even after the artist has sold the work. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG,
COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 477 (4th ed. 1993). Because Euro-
pean IP regimes emphasize the author's rights, moral rights are widely recognized, espe-
cially for artistic and sculptural works. American IP law has been much more grudging. See
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (noting, however, that courts have provided protection of the au-
thor's personal rights through the application of contract or tort law theories).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 para. 40(1) (1994). The second definition of a work for hire is
a list of nine discrete types of works specially ordered or commissioned for use:
(1) contribution to a collective work;






(8) answer material for a test; or
(9) atlas.
Id. para. 40(2). However, even if the work falls into one of the above categories, the parties
must also expressly agree in a signed writing that the work is considered a work for hire for
the work to be truly a work for hire. Id.
36. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
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agency principles.3 7 The Reid court balanced a number of factors38 to
determine whether the creator was an "employee" or an "independ-
ent contractor" within the "work for hire" definition.39 However,
some lower courts have considered the last two Reid factors-the pro-
vision of employee benefits and the tax treatment of the hired party-
to be the key factors in the Reid balancing test.40 Based on these two
37. AL at 740-41.
38. The factors are:
(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the prod-
uct is accomplished;
(2) the skill required;
(3) the source of the instrumentalities and tools;
(4) the location of the work;
(5) the duration of the relationship between the parties;
(6) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party;
(7) the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;
(8) the method of payment;
(9) the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
(10) whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
(11) whether the hiring party is in business;
(12) the provision of employee benefits; and
(13) the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id at 751-52.
39. In Reid, a nonprofit organization devoted to helping homeless people (CCNV)
commissioned a sculptor (Reid) to create a sculpture to "dramatize the plight of the home-
less," but the agreement was not in writing and copyright was not mentioned. Id. at 733-34.
CCNV members gave some suggestions to Reid about aspects of the sculpture, which Reid
accepted. ld. at 734. After the sculpture was finished, CCNV wanted to take the statue on a
national tour to raise money for the homeless, but Reid objected, claiming the sculpture
was not strong enough to undergo the trip. Id. at 735. Reid filed for copyright protection
for the sculpture, and CCNV contested this filing in federal court. Id
The District Court ruled that Reid was an "employee" of CCNV because CCNV moti-
vated the sculpture's production. Id. at 735-36. Thus, the court deemed the sculpture a
work for hire under § 101 para. 40(1) and held that CCNV owned the copyright. Id The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, and the Supreme Court upheld
this reversal. Id. at 736.
Using the factors listed supra in note 38 (which were not explicitly contained in the
Copyright Act), the Court acknowledged that CCNV had some creative input but empha-
sized that all the other factors pointed toward Reid's being an independent contractor. Id.
at 752-53. For example, Reid owned his own tools, he was in a skilled profession, and
CCNV did not pay his payroll or Social Security taxes. Id. Therefore, Reid was an in-
dependent contractor, not an employee. Thus, under § 101 para. 40(1), CCNV was not the
"author." Id. at 753. Paragraph 40(2) did not apply in this case because there was no writ-
ing to indicate that the work was considered a work for hire. ld.
40. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 863 (2d Cir. 1992) (commenting that "the
importance of these two factors is underscored by the fact that every case since Reid that
has applied the [Reid] test has found the hiring party to be an independent contractor
where the hiring party failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes"). But see 1
MELvILLE B. NimmER & DAVID NIMMER, NiMnMR ON CoPYRiGHT § 5.03[B][1][a][iii], at
5-20 to 5-32 (1994) [hereinafter NmnnmR] (criticizing Aymes for improperly "elevat[ing]
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factors, professors are employees rather than independent contractors
because universities provide extensive benefits for professors and
treat professors as employees for tax purposes.41 Therefore, courts
should find that faculty works are "works for hire" and give ownership
of copyrights to the university.
Nevertheless, influential judges and many commentators have
concluded that the works of university professors are not works for
hire under the Copyright Act.42 These judges and commentators have
imputed a "teacher exception" to the work-for-hire doctrine, allowing
university professors to own the copyright in their work, contrary to
the express language of the work-for-hire statutes.43 The concept that
these factors [into all but] a bright line rule for resolving the work for hire analysis" and
ignoring the teachings of Reid).
41. See Rivera v. Hospital Universitario, 762 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.P.R. 1991) (discussing
the employer-independent-contractor issue in the medical malpractice context); Bilenas v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 217, 219 (1983); Sherri L. Burr, A Critical Assessment of
Reid's Work for Hire Framework and Its Potential Impact on the Marketplace for Scholarly
Works, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 119, 139 (1990). If all thirteen Reid factors are given equal
weight, as Nimmer advocates, four factors weigh for the conclusion that professors are
employees, four factors weigh for the conclusion that professors are independent contrac-
tors, and the remaining five do not weigh decisively for either side. Burr, supra, at 140.
However, this categorization ends up being irrelevant to the issue of ownership of copy-
right. If professors are independent contractors, then they as creators own the copyrights in
their works. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. If professors are employees, then
the "teacher exception" to the work-for-hire doctrine gives them ownership of the copy-
rights in their works. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
42. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412,416-17 (7th Cir. 1988) (opinion by Judge
Richard Posner); NIMMER, supra note 40, § 5.03[B][1][b][i] & n.94, at 5-34 to 5-35; Laura
G. Lape, Ownership of Copyrightable Works of University Professors: The Interplay Be-
tween the Copyright Act and University Copyright Policies, 37 VILL. L. REv. 223, 246
(1992). But see Leonard D. DuBoff, An Academic's Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 17, 26 (1985) ("[A]cademicians are likely employees, and their publish-
ing activities.., generally fall within the scope of their employment, thus probably depriv-
ing them of the copyright in their scholarly works."); Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are
They "Works Made for Hire" Under the 1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485,508 (1982-
1983) (arguing that unless the courts create an exception, faculty are subject to traditional
"work-for-hire" analysis under the Copyright Act).
Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th
Cir. 1987), does not clarify matters. At first, he claims that 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), coupled with
17 U.S.C. § 101 para. 40(2), are "general enough to make every academic article a 'work
for hire' and therefore vest exclusive control in universities rather than scholars." Id. at
1094. Later, he acknowledges the "tradition" that faculty members own the copyrights in
their academic work and that "this 'tradition' covers scholarly articles and other intellec-
tual property." Id. Thus, Judge Easterbrook seems to adopt the view later taken by Judge
Posner in Hays: the work-for-hire statute literally seems to cover academic works, but that
is not the proper result, and the courts should and will not reach it. See infra notes 45-47
and accompanying text.
43. The 1976 Copyright Act dramatically reworked many copyright statutes, including
the work-for-hire statutes. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (1994); Russ VerSteeg, Copyright and
the Educational Process: The Right of Teacher Inception, 75 IowA L. REv. 381, 387-88
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professors own the copyright in their own work is one of ancient heri-
tage and has been recognized in the pre-1976 case law.44 In Hays v.
Sony Corp. of America,45 Judge Posner, a former university professor
himself, endorsed the continued existence of the teacher exception for
three primary reasons: it is an "ancient tradition"; the absence in the
legislative history of any congressional motive to eliminate the excep-
tion; and "the havoc that [eliminating the teacher exception] would
wreak in the settled practices of academic institutions. ' 46 Because lit-
tle case law from other circuits exists on this issue, Posner's explana-
tion, although dicta, is essentially the law.47
To summarize, courts have recognized a teacher exception that
exempts faculty-written copyrightable works from the work-for-hire
doctrine. Since professors are thus "authors" of their works, profes-
sors own the accompanying copyrights. 48
B. Patent
Obtaining a patent is much more difficult than obtaining a copy-
right. There are four requirements for obtaining a utility49 patent. The
(1990) (asserting that the 1976 Copyright Act "put a new spin" on the definition of "au-
thor" by establishing the "work-for-hire" doctrine). Before 1976, "work-for-hire" was not
defined in the Copyright Act, but in 1976, paragraph 40 of § 101, defining "work for hire,"
was added. Id However, "the legislative history of the [1976 Copyright] Act indicates that
Congress did not intend to change the law regarding work for hire when a regular employ-
ment relationship exists." IM. at 388.
44. See GoRmAN & GINSBURG, supra note 33, at 267-68 (collecting cases).
45. 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
46. Id. at 416.
47. "[W]e might, if forced to decide the issue, conclude that the exception had sur-
vived the enactment of the 1976 Act." Id. at 416-17; see also VerSteeg, supra note 43, at
405.
48. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. However, if graduate assistants helped
prepare the work and the intent on all sides was that "their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole," the resulting work may be a "joint
work." 17 U.S.C. § 101 para. 20 (1994) (defining "joint work"). The graduate assistants
would be co-authors with the professor and share equally in ownership of the copyright,
regardless of the relative contributions of any particular author. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)
(1994); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991) (stressing that even if one
author is "dominant," joint authorship is still possible). For an exhaustive discussion of
joint authorship problems, see Scott C. Brophy, Joint Authorship Under the Copyright Law,
16 HASTINGS Comm. & Ewr. L.J. 451 (1994).
49. In this Note, "patents" refers to utility patents because they are the most common
type of patent issued. In fact, the overwhelming majority of all patents are utility patents.
See Authorization of Funds for the Patent and Trademark Office: Hearing on S. 793 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1991) (statement of Harry M. Manbeck, Jr., Commissioner
of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
There are two other types of patents: design patents and plant patents. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 171 (1988) (design); 15 U.S.C. § 161 (1988) (plant). The requirements for these types of
patents are slightly different than for utility patents. The requirements for design patents
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alleged invention must be novel,50 be nonobvious,51 have utility,52 and
be within a class of patentable subject matter.53 Except for a few nar-
rowly confined exceptions, inventors themselves must apply for the
patents.54 The inventor is the person who comes up with the original
inventive concept and "reduces it to practice. ' 55 Patent law, unlike
are novelty, originality, nonobviousness, and ornamentality. 35 U.S.C. § 171. The require-
ments for plant patents are novelty, distinctness, asexual reproduction, and improvement
over similar plants. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1988); Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant
Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1378-79 (5th Cir. 1976) (defining nonobviousness in terms of im-
provement). For a general discussion of design patents, see Leonard Michaelson, The Na-
ture of the Protection of Artistic and Industrial Design, 37 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 543 (1955). A
counterpart for plant patents is Raymond A. Magnuson, A Short Discussion on Various
Aspects of Plant Patents, 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 493 (1948).
50. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1988); see also Note, Novelty and Reduction to Practice:
Patent Confusion, 75 YALE L.J. 1194, 1195 (1966), reprinted in PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPY-
RIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DocTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY 387 (3d ed. 1993) ("If knowledge of the subject
sought to be patented has already been made available to the public [and thus there is no
novelty], then a patent grant would serve no useful purpose, but would injure the public by
removing existing knowledge from the public domain.").
51. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). An invention is obvious and therefore ineligible for a pat-
ent if "the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the inven-
tion was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertaiirs." Id.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The test for utility varies by class of subject matter:
mechanical machines are usually presumed to be useful, while chemical compositions must
show that some "specific benefit exists in currently available form." Brenner v. Manson,
383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1965); see 1 DONALD S. CHiSUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT § 4.01, at 4-2 (1994).
53. There are 5 classes of patentable subject matter for utility patents:
(1) processes (which includes a new use of known processes, machines, manufac-
tures, compositions of matter, or material);
(2) machines;
(3) manufactures;
(4) compositions of matter; and
(5) new and useful improvements of items falling in categories (l)-(4).
35 U.S.C. §§ 100-101 (1988).
54. 35 U.S.C. §§ 115-118 (1988). The "narrowly confined exceptions" are described in
Sections 116-118 of the Patent Code. Section 116 deals with joint inventors. If one joint
inventor does not wish to make a patent application or is unreachable, the other inventor
can make the application in both their names. Section 117 allows legal representatives of
deceased or mentally incapacitated inventors to apply for patents. Section 118 allows any-
one with sufficient proprietary interest in the invention (like an assignee) to make the
patent application if the inventor:
(1) refuses to execute the patent application; or
(2) cannot be found or reached after diligent effort.
35 U.S.C. §§ 117-118 (1988).
55. Cherensky, supra note 22, at 602. "Reduction to practice" is a term of art in the
patent field and signifies that "the conception is embodied in readily utilizable form,"
which is necessary to receive a patent. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, at 407-08.
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copyright law,56 has no "invention for hire" doctrine-the "inventor"
must be a natural person.5 7
Applying this doctrine in the university context, we see that be-
cause the professor originated the inventive concept and reduced it to
practice, the professor is the inventor and would seem to own all pat-
ent rights in the invention.5 8 However, in certain cases equitable prin-
ciples embodied in state law force inventor-employees to assign their
patents to their employers.5 9 More specifically, if employees are hired
to invent, rights in the invention, once obtained by the inventor-em-
ployee, must go to the employer.60 But if the inventor-employee was
not hired to invent, she owns the patent rights outright.61 At most, the
There are three ways to reduce an invention to practice. First, the inventor could suc-
cessfully employ the invention in its intended setting. Second, the inventor could file a
patent application, which is considered a constructive reduction to practice. Third, the in-
ventor could produce a document which specifies sufficient detail about the invention so
that a person skilled in the relevant art could recreate the invention. Id. (claiming that In re
Borst, 345 F.2d 851 (C.C.P.A. 1965), created the last method of reduction to practice).
56. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
57. See Cherensky, supra note 22, at 603.
58. Note that a university cannot be a joint inventor with the professor because the
university is not a natural person and cannot contribute an inventive concept. See icL How-
ever, unlike the university, graduate students who work for professors often do contribute
inventive concepts. Allocating rights and royalties among professors and their graduate
aqsistants is a tricky endeavor and is outside the focus of this Note. For an informative look
at the problem of joint inventorship, see W. Fritz Fasse, The Muddy Metaphysics of Joint
Inventorship: Cleaning Up After the 1984 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116, 5 HARV. J.L. &
TE CH. 153 (1992).
59. See Cherensky, supra note 22, at 615-16; Chew, supra note 9, at 264.
60. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, amended, 289 U.S.
706 (1933) for this general proposition. Although Dubilier is not binding on states because
it enunciates federal common law, it has been tremendously influential and has been fol-
lowed in virtually every state. See Chew, supra note 9, at 265 n.21. Although the invention
in Dubilier was patentable, the principles enunciated by the Court have been followed for
nonpatentable inventions as well. See id. at 262 n.8.
In Dubilier, the hired parties were two government researchers employed by the Fed-
eral Bureau of Standards. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 183. Chew likens these researchers to uni-
versity professors. See Chew, supra note 9, at 262. While performing their usual work
(investigating aircraft problems), they invented a way of improving radio reception and
also "the idea of energizing a dynamic type of loudspeaker from an alternating current
house-lighting circuit." Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 185. They were not hired to invent these in-
ventions. Id. The Court stated that because these inventors were not hired to invent, the
employer received only a shop right, "but the employer in such a case has no equity to
demand a conveyance of the invention, which is the original conception of the employee
alone, in which the employer played no part." Id. at 188-89. The Court made no distinction
(or more precisely, said that it was up to Congress to make a distinction) between govern-
ment and private employees-the same rules apply to both. See id. at 189-91, 198-99. Thus,
generally, employers only have a shop right in their employees' inventions.
61. See Chew, supra note 9, at 264. The inventor is presumptively the owner of the
patent rights in her invention. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 152 (1988); Cherensky, supra note 22,
at 604. Once the patent application has been filed or even after the patent has been issued,
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employer could receive a shop right-a royalty-free license to use the
invention. 62 The employer can receive this shop right only if it makes
a "noninventive contribution," which is money, laboratory space, or
other supplies that enable the invention to come to life.63
What does all of this mean in the university context? First, we
must decide whether professors are "hired to invent." Since professors
are usually hired to teach and do general research in areas substan-
tially of their own choosing, not to create particular products, they
have not been "hired to invent."64 Courts have interpreted "hired to
the inventor can and usually does assign the patent rights to anyone, including a corpora-
tion. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988); Cherensky, supra note 22, at 604.
62. JASPER S. COSTA, THE LAW OF INVENTING IN EMPLOYMENT 4 (1953).
63. See Reichman, Overlapping Rights, supra note 10, at 66 & n.68; Chew, supra note
9, at 269-70 & n.41.
64. Chew, supra note 9, at 271. What factors determine whether employees are "hired
to invent"? See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 397 cmts. a-c, illus. 1-2 (1957) (list-
ing several relevant factors); Paul C. Van Slyke & Mark M. Friedman, Employer's Rights to
Inventions and Patents of Its Officers, Directors, and Employees, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP.
LEGAL Ass'N Q.J. 127, 141 (1990) ("The key factor in determining whether an employee
was hired to invent is the specificity of the task assigned to the employee. Where ... the
employee is hired to 'do research' for the employer, title will ... remain with the em-
ployee/inventor."). Professors customarily are not hired for specific tasks-they have more
general missions, such as "doing research." Being hired to perform research, even focused
research on a particular practical problem, is not the same as being hired to invent.
The one case that seems to hold to the contrary is Speck v. North Carolina Dairy
Foundation, 319 S.E.2d 139 (N.C. 1984). In that case, Dr. Speck and his assistant created a
process by which acidophilus bacteria (a type of bacteria that aids digestion) could be ad-
ded to milk without causing a sour taste, thus making it possible to market acidophilus milk
on a large scale. Id. at 140-41. When the Dairy Foundation, Speck's employer and a subsid-
iary of North Carolina State University, claimed that Speck had no royalty rights in this
process, Speck sued. Id. at 142-43. Although Speck signed the university patent policy,
which provided that the university would take title to the invention in exchange for grant-
ing a 15% royalty to the inventing professor, the policy did not apply because the bacteria
process was not patented but was kept as a trade secret. Id. at 141-44. There was no written
university policy regarding faculty-created trade secrets. Id. at 143-44.
The North Carolina Supreme Court used common-law principles to find that Dr.
Speck was hired to invent, so the invention belonged exclusively to the university and
Speck had no valid royalty claims. Id. at 143. This decision did not hinge on the status of
the bacteria process as a trade secret; common-law ownership principles do not depend on
the form of IP protection used to protect the creation. See, e.g., Chew, supra note 9, at 265
n.22 (citing examples of employer-employee disputes over rights to employee creations,
involving various creations and IP protections).
However, Speck has been much criticized, especially with regard to the court's impli-
cation that university professors are usually "hired to invent." See Christopher G. Brown-
ing, Jr., Note, The Souring of Sweet Acidophilus Milk: Speck v. North Carolina Dairy
Foundation and the Rights of University Faculty to Their Inventive Ideas, 63 N.C. L. REv.
1248, 1258 (1985); Chew, supra note 9, at 301-02; Reichman, Overlapping Rights, supra
note 10, at 104. Speck is best understood as holding that under those particular facts, Dr.
Speck and his assistant were hired to invent a particular product. Applying Speck to inven-
tions created by regular university professors performing general research is debatable and
probably incorrect.
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invent" narrowly, giving the benefit of the doubt to employees rather
than employers.65 Thus, professors own the patent fights in their in-
ventions outright.66
Second, we must decide whether the university obtains a shop
fight in faculty-created inventions. Since professors typically use
money and laboratory space provided by the university, the university
has made a noninventive contribution and thus deserves a shop
fight.67 Shop fights have some value because they allow internal use
by the university, including use by other professors at the university. 68
However, possessing shop rights does not allow the university to sell
the invention to the outside world,69 and as Willie Sutton, the most
pithy of robbers, once said about banks, "that's where the money
's."70
In summary, university professors own their inventions and the
accompanying patent fights; universities must be content with a shop
right.
IH. How University IP Policies Change these Default Rules
The ownership rules described in Part I prescribe that professors
own the copyrights in their copyrightable works and the patents on
their patentable inventions. However, university IP policies, generally
imposed through employment contracts, change this prescription, usu-
ally to the professors' detriment. This Part discusses how these poli-
cies operate and how they vary.
65. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188-89, amended,
289 U.S. 706 (1933); University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1219 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
66. See Chew, supra note 9, at 271; Reichman, Overlapping Rights, supra note 10, at
66-67.
67. See Chew, supra note 9, at 269-70.
68. But see id. at 270 (discounting the benefits universities obtain from having shop
rights).
69. COSTA, supra note 62, at 31.
70. Willie Sutton was literate enough to write an autobiography, albeit with help.
WLLIAM SuTrON, WHERE = MoiNy WAS (1976) (written with Edward Linn). Oddly
enough, the fame of this quotation, universally attributed to Sutton, was not enough to put
it into BARan~rT'is FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992). However,
people continue to use this quotation and attribute it to Sutton. See, e.g., Patrick R. Kane,
Rehabilitation-The Prison System: "Warehouse Rehabilitation" Federal Bureau of Prisons,
34 How. L.. 496, 496-97 (1991); Dana Priest, "Non-Defense" Projects Targeted: Pentagon




A. Mode of Operation
Many university IP policies are dictated by written agreements
when employment begins.71 Other universities implement their IP pol-
icies (especially if they are revising these policies) through faculty
handbooks, which generally act as enforceable employee contracts.72
Although these agreements and handbooks seem to have defects
when analyzed from a contract law standpoint,7 3 courts have consist-
ently upheld them.74
These policies typically require professors to assign creations and
any accompanying IP rights to the university in exchange for a speci-
fied percentage of any royalties the university may receive.75 At many
schools, the royalties paid to professors are a flat percentage of the
total revenue received (ranging from 15% to 50% at major research
universities), but at others royalties are paid on a sliding scale based
on net income received by the university.76 At many schools, a per-
centage of royalty revenue goes to the professor's department.77 This
71. See Reichman, Overlapping Rights, supra note 10, at 69; Lape, supra note 42, at
248.
72. See Lape, supra note 42, at 248-50 & n.105.
73. The clear result reached by courts is not without question, however. Professors
often fail to realize the true import of university IP policies and the drastic effects these
policies have on ownership rights. See Chew, supra note 9, at 289; Cherensky, supra note
22, at 622 (asserting that preinvention assignments present "arguable cases" of substantive
and procedural unconscionability). In addition, professors are given little or no considera-
tion for the agreement. See Cherensky, supra note 22, at 623-24.
74. See Cherensky, supra note 22, at 620-21 n.113 (citing the very few cases that hold
differently); Chew, supra note 9, at 286.
75. Lape, supra note 42, at 264 (describing various university copyright policies);
Reichman, Overlapping Rights, supra note 10, at 69 (discussing professors' assignment of
patent rights to their university employers).
76. Compare CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, FACULTY HANDBOOK, ch. 7,
at 6 (1984) [hereinafter CALTECH POLICY] (granting the creator of a copyrightable work a
flat 15% of the proceeds) and UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, THE GENERAL RULES CONCERN-
ING UNIVERSITY ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE, art. III, § 1(f) (1994) [hereinafter ILLI-
NOIS POLICY] (granting 50% of the first $200,000 cumulative net income and 25%
thereafter) with UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PATENT POL-
ICY, pt. II.C (1990) [hereinafter U.C. POLICY] (granting the inventor of a patentable inven-
tion 50% of the first $100,000 of cumulative net royalties, 35% of the next $400,000, and
20% thereafter).
77. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY LI-
CENSING, AGREEMENT CONCERNING DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY AND DISTRIBUTION
OF INCOME, ch. 4, at 1 (1994) [hereinafter BERKELEY POLICY] (granting the department of
the faculty creator 50% of adjusted net royalties). U.C. Berkeley's system of IP rights is
somewhat unique. Creators of "technology," the blanket term used to encompass software,
patentable inventions, and the like, may opt to use either the U.C. Berkeley policy or the
University of California policy described in note 76. Letter from Scott A. Taper, Jr., Licens-
ing Associate, U.C. Berkeley Office of Technology Licensing, to authpr (July 12, 1994) (on
file with author). Thus, inventors who wish to benefit their department opt for the U.C.
Berkeley policy, but inventors who do not wish to benefit their department opt for the
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encourages departments, which are generally strapped for money, to
support practical, market-oriented faculty creations. Usually, profes-
sors have little influence over the marketing and licensing of the crea-
tion-the university technology transfer office ("TTO") has full
control.78
B. The Scope of IP Policies
University IP policies differ widely in their scope. These policies
regulate faculty creation in two ways: they regulate what types of IP
are covered, and they regulate the level of university involvement nec-
essary for the university to claim IP rights. Some university policies
expressly claim for the university almost all IP rights (copyright and
patent alike),79 while others expressly disclaim most, if not all, rights
in any faculty-created intellectual propertyS0 The majority position
among university policies occupies the middle ground by claiming sub-
stantial rights in patentable inventions but few or no rights in copy-
rightable works.8 '
University of California policy because, on average, the royalties due the inventor will be
higher under this policy. See U.C. POLICY, supra note 76, at pt. H.C.
78. See e.g., BERKELEY POLICY, supra note 77, at 1 (disclaiming any liability if the
university fails to generate income from the creation, thus making it difficult for inventors
to police the university); Lape, supra note 42, at 263 (stating that none of the universities
surveyed gave professors unilateral control over who exploits the creation and only a few
schools gave any control). Note that at most universities that claim rights in faculty cre-
ations, university TTOs have monopoly status, so the professors must use the TrO to dis-
seminate their product.
79. See Chew, supra note 9, at 280 (discussing "supra-maximalist" universities that
claim ownership of all faculty inventions); Lape, supra note 42, at 257-58 (discussing uni-
versities that claim ownership to faculty works if any university resources were employed
in the creation process).
80. The University of Wisconsin, Madison, is the most notable university to take this
position, especially with regard to patentable inventions. UNIVERsrrY OF WIScoNSIN-
MADISON, PATENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 1 (1984) [hereinafter Wisc. POLICY]
("[Our] tradition of not claiming proprietary rights in any invention generated by faculty,
staff, and students under funding containing no patent restrictions remains unchanged.").
The exception with regard to funding restrictions is discussed in Part III.A.4 in connection
with the Bayh-Dole Act. There are other universities that claim rights in very few inven-
tions. For example, Harvard University claims rights only in inventions affecting medicine
and public health. Chew, supra note 9, at 282-83.
Many universities do not have copyright policies, and absent a university copyright
policy, the professor has full ownership. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
81. See Lape, supra note 42, at 251 ("Universities have long claimed ownership of the
patentable inventions of faculty members, but traditionally have not claimed their copy-
rightable works."); Reichman, Applied Know-How, supra note 11, at 648. But see Rochelle
C. Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CIn. L. REv. 590,
592 (1987) (observing that universities have begun to assert copyright claims in an attempt
to offset declining revenue in other areas).
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(1) Copyright
Most universities do not have formal copyright policies. 82 The
long-standing tradition of uniVersities to refrain from claiming any
rights in faculty-created copyrightable works obviated the need for
university copyright policies. 83 However, in the last twenty years,
more and more universities have begun adopting copyright policies.
84
This increase arose primarily from the money-making potential inher-
ent in a new variety of copyrightable works: computer programs, vide-
otapes, multimedia, and other technologically oriented works.85
Very few universities grant professors rights in all copyrightable
works.86 Instead, universities that have copyright policies tend to
claim faculty works only if they were created with university re-
sources87 or if they are not "traditional. '88
Details of these policies vary widely among universities.8 9 How-
ever, most universities have no formal copyright policies and thus can-
not claim copyrights in faculty creations.90
(2) Patent
University patent policies are much more common and have a
longer history than do university copyright policies. 91 The primary
82. See Lape, supra note 42, at 251-52.
83. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988); Weinstein v.
University of II1., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987). Note that in this context, when the
university "claims rights," it is claiming rights through contractual means. This is much
different than the university having initial ownership of the copyright through the "work
for hire" doctrine. See supra Part I.B.
84. Lape, supra note 42, at 251.
85. See id. at 254 n.130; Reichman, Overlapping Rights, supra note 10, at 80-82. Be-
cause of computer software's money-making potential, it has inspired the creation of uni-
versity copyright policies. See Lape, supra note 42, at 254-55 n.130. Some universities do
expressly claim ownership of computer programs through their copyright policies. See id.
(collecting university policies). Others treat them sui generis or at least distinguish them
from both copyrightable works and patentable inventions. See, e.g., BERKELEY POLICY,
supra note 77, at 1. A few lump computer programs into their patent policy, although many
if not most programs are ineligible for patent protection. Reichman, Overlapping Rights,
supra note 10, at 82 n.148 (citing Massachusetts Institute of Technology procedures).
Schools with no copyright policy must necessarily treat computer programs like other
copyrightable works, allowing the professor to own the program. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
86. See Lape, supra note 42, at 259-62.
87. See id. at 257-58.
88. This is merely a polite way of saying that universities are claiming copyrightable
works based solely on the works' money-making potential for the university. See id. at 264-
65.
89. Id. at 256.
90. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
91. Lape, supra note 42, at 251.
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reason is the obvious money-making potential of patentable inven-
tions, as opposed to the uncertain viability of traditional copyrightable
works such as books and scholarly articles. 92 Although some resist-
ance to university ownership of patents existed in the past,93 in the last
thirty years almost all universities have taken the position that patent-
ing inventions does not interfere with scientific research.94
Several reasons for this shift exist. First, as government funds de-
crease, universities look upon patent royalties as a potential "cash
cow" income stream, unaffected by changes in congressional or state
research funding.95 Second, without patent protection, the costly de-
velopment needed to bring this research to market will not occur, thus
hurting society.96 Third, the feared overcommercialization of
academia because of university patenting has not occurred. 97
University patent policies vary in the level of university involve-
ment required to claim rights in faculty inventions, but more uniform-
ity among universities exists here than in the case of copyright
policies. The majority position is that universities will claim rights in
inventions created by professors using university resources or as part
of their research.
98
92. See Chew, supra note 9, at 272 (characterizing "the promise of wealth and
treasures" as the spark behind university patent policies). Computer software and new
multimedia technology spurred the creation of new university copyright policies because of
the money-making potential, but because computer software began its boom much later
than did patentable research, it is no surprise that university patent policies have existed
far longer than university copyright policies. See Lape, supra note 42, at 253-54 n.130 (dis-
cussing what motivates the creation of university copyright policies for computer software).
93. The arguments were that patenting would prevent disclosure of reseapch results
and might also distort the academic mission. Phyllis S. Lachs, University Patent Policy, 10
J.C. & U.L. 263, 263-66 (1983-1984).
94. See id. at 263; see also Reichman, Applied Know-How, supra note 11, at 644.
95. See Lachs, supra note 93, at 268-69; see also Reichman, Applied Know-How, supra
note 11, at 644.
96. Very little technology transfer from academia to industry occurred prior to the
advent of university patenting. See Lachs, supra note 93, at 266-68; see also Reichman,
Applied Know-How, supra note 11, at 645-46.
97. See infra Part II.A.2 for an in-depth discussion of this issue.
98. Roughly speaking, universities fall into three main categories:
1. Universities that claim no patentable inventions-the professor who creates
the invention keeps all patent rights.
2. Universities that claim inventions if professors use university resources or de-
velop inventions in the scope of their employment.
3. Universities that claim any invention created by their professors.
This categorization is adapted from Chew, supra note 9, at 276. Universities that fall
into category 3 suffer from the problem that, in many states, statutes designed to protect
inventors often restrict the scope of the university policy: in essence, category 3 schools
often become de facto category 2 schools. See Chew, supra note 9, at 287-88 n.111 (citing
statutes from California, Illinois, and North Carolina, among others); see also Reichman,
Overlapping Rights, supra note 10, at 69. Very few major research universities fall into
category 1. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
November 1995]
I. The Case for Faculty Ownership of IP Rights in Their
Creations
Part II found that the majority of university IP policies change
the default ownership rules for patentable inventions but not for copy-
rightable works.99 Thus, professors who create patentable inventions
usually have no control over the licensing of their inventions and re-
ceive only a small, contractually predesignated percentage of any roy-
alties because they do not own their inventions. 100 Professors who
create copyrightable works, on the other hand, usually have full con-
trol over the marketing of their works and can negotiate their own
royalties with outside buyers without involving the university.10 1 This
Part has two primary contentions: the justifications universities pro-
vide for owning any IP rights (patent or copyright) in faculty creations
are suspect; and professors, universities, and society in general would
benefit if faculty members owned all IP rights in their creations.
A. Why the Justifications for University Ownership of Faculty Creations
Are Suspect
Generally, four reasons are commonly offered for university own-
ership of IP rights in faculty creations:
1. Because universities provide the resources for faculty creations,
they have inherent rights in these creations.
2. Universities should own the IP rights in faculty creations to pre-
vent corruption and conflict-of-interest problems among professors
looking to strike it rich.
3. Universities badly need the royalty revenue from licensing
faculty creations, so they must own the IP rights in these creations.
4. Under federal law (the Bayh-Dole Act in particular), 0 2 the uni-
versity must own the IP rights in faculty creations.
These rationales for university ownership have varying levels of
validity, but in the aggregate, they are not convincing.
(1) Use of University Resources
Universities often justify their claim of complete ownership of
patentable inventions or certain copyrightable works (not just shop
rights) by emphasizing the professors' use of university resources.
103
99. See supra text accompanying notes 90 & 98.
100. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
102. See infra Part III.A.4.
103. See, e.g., CALTECH POLICY, supra note 76, ch. 7, at 5 ("Inventions made by em-
ployees.., with the use of [Caltech] facilities may be patented.... Such patent properties
are to be assigned to [Caltech] .... ); ILLINOIS POLICY, supra note 76, at 13 ("Inventions
shall belong to [Illinois] if conceived or reduced to practice:... (2) through the use of any
person of [Illinois] resources .... "); M.I.T. TECHNOLOGY LICENSING OFFICE, GUIDE TO
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Apparently, this is a claim of equity-because professors are using our
pencils, we must own the drawing, universities say.'0 4
However, universities are not contributing the essentials of crea-
tion-the momentary flash of genius accompanied by the quiet, dog-
ged determination needed for production of a masterpiece or a major
scientific breakthrough. On the contrary, the professors are. 05 Uni-
versities make only moderate contributions to the creative process,
and in fact they may receive moderate rewards even without claiming
ownership of the creation: a shop right'0 6 in the creation (if applica-
ble) 107 and a heightened reputation in the academic world for having
creative professors. 08 After all, universities hire professors to do gen-
eral research, not to invent specific products. In United States v.
Dubilier,0 9 the United States Supreme Court recognized that equity
was on the side of the inventor:
[W]here a servant, during his hours of employment, working
with his master's materials and appliances, conceives and perfects
an invention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his
master a [shop right]. This is an application of equitable princi-
ples .... But the employer in such a case has no equity to demand a
conveyance of the invention, which is the original conception of the
employee alone, in which the employer had no part." 0
Similar considerations exist for the author of copyrightable
works."' Universities deserve some recompense for providing the raw
THE OWNERSHIP, DISTRIBUTION, AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF M.I.T. TECHNOL-
OGY 5 (1989) [hereinafter M.I.T. POLICY] ("[If a creation] is developed by M.I.T.
faculty... using significant M.I.T. funds or facilities, M.I.T. will own the [relevant] intellec-
tual property.").
104. See Lape, supra note 42, at 257.
105. "The creative process starts with a brilliant idea .... You can't have a good tech-
nologist who doesn't wake up in the middle of the night searching for answers." William
Taylor, The Business of Innovation: An Interview with Paul Cook, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-
Apr. 1990, at 96, 98-99 (comments of Paul Cook, CEO of Raychem Corporation), quoted
in Cherensky, supra note 22, at 614-15.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63 for a full explanation of the "shop right"
concept.
107. True, a shop right in an improved disk drive is more useful than a shop right in a
book of poetry. But if the shop right in a particular creation is not helpful to the university,
the university could instead require the professor to reimburse the university for the use of
university resources. See Chew, supra note 9, at 270.
108. See Chew, supra note 9, at 270.
109. 289 U.S. 178, amended, 289 U.S. 706 (1933).
110. Id. at 188-89 (emphasis added).
111. See, e.g., Weinstein v. University of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987). In Weinstein,
one professor sued two other professors and the University of Illinois because he was not
designated as the lead author on a scholarly article co-written by all three professors and
funded by the university. Id, at 1092-93. Although the professors used university resources,
the court found that the article was a joint work co-owned by all three professors, not a
work for hire owned by the university. Id. at 1094-95; see supra note 42.
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materials for creation, but they receive it in the form of shop rights
and increased faculty reputation, both of which have real value. 12
Thus, when balancing the equities, the scale tips toward the professor,
not the university.
(2) Preventing Faculty Corruption
Universities often claim that they must own the IP rights in
faculty creations to prevent professors from corrupting academia. 11 3
The basic fear is that professors will devote too much time to applied
research rather than basic "pure" research for economic reasons, thus
distorting the academic mission. However, this explanation applies
with equal force to universities themselves. If universities rely on roy-
alty revenue from marketable creations, they may pressure professors
into producing such creations, which also distorts the academic tradi-
tion.114 Universities, however, assert that greater concerns motivate
them to claim IP rights in faculty creations. 115
In addition, the supposed parade of horrors to which patents in
academia were supposed to lead-pervasive secrecy, abandonment of
basic research for applied research, publication of misleading results
to fool rival researchers-has not occurred to any great extent.1
16
Highly celebrated cases of professors behaving unethically have oc-
curred, but these are rare.117 If universities are vigilant about enforc-
ing rules of permissible conduct, granting professors full IP rights in
112. See supra text accompanying note 108.
113. See, e.g., Letter from William Hoskins, Director, U.C. Berkeley Office of Technol-
ogy Licensing, to author (Oct. 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hoskins Letter]
("[M]andatory assignments of patent rights [to the university] are necessary to ensure pub-
lic funds are not used for private gain.").
114. See Chew, supra note 9, at 304-07; Reichman, Applied Know-How, supra note 11,
at 719-21.
115. University IP policies consistently contain high-minded language about the impor-
tance of technology transfer to society. See, e.g., M.I.T. POLICY, supra note 103, at 3
("[T]echnology transfer . . . is an important aspect of M.I.T.'s commitment to public ser-
vice."). However, this does not explain why M.1.T., as opposed to M.I.T. professors, should
own the IP rights to creations produced by these professors.
116. "'The problems are more of perception than reality,' contends Katherine Ku, as-
sociate director of Stanford's Office of Technology Licensing." Siler et al., supra note 11, at
92. But see generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) (taking a contrary view in the specific
context of biotechnology research).
117. One celebrated case is that of Dr. Scheffer C.G. Tsueng, a professor formerly
affiliated with Harvard. Tsueng held a substantial block of stock in the company estab-
lished to market the experimental eye ointment he was testing. Before he published data
showing the ointment to be a failure, Tsueng cashed in his shares and made a large profit.
Siler et al., supra note 11, at 90.
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their creations will not lead to additional problems.118 Besides, ethical
problems such as outside consulting and manipulation of test data are
not the fault of patents in academia-they are present throughout in
the academic research setting.1 9
The most extreme solution would be for professors and universi-
ties simply not to claim any IP rights in faculty creations. That solu-
tion, in vogue earlier this century, was discarded because granting IP
rights tends to increase technology transfer and increase the produc-
tion of creative works.120 The risk of corruption is omnipresent when
money is involved; the question is one of balancing those risks against
the advantages of owning IP rights.121 On one hand, it is unclear
whether granting 100% of royalties to professors instead of 50% or
35% increases the risk of corruption. 122 On the other hand, there are
significant advantages to professors owning full IP rights, described in
full detail in Part III.B. Thus, the claim that universities are preventing
faculty corruption by owning IP rights in faculty creations is weak at
best. 2
3
(3) Loss of Revenue
Universities fear that if professors own the IP rights to their cre-
ations, universities will suffer a devastating loss of royalty revenue.
Universities receive substantial royalties generated by faculty cre-
ations; more than $172 million in patent royalties was collected in fis-
cal year 1992, for instance. 24 If all professors actually decided to
market their creations themselves, universities would lose this reve-
118. For example, state regulations require that "when researchers at California's pub-
lic universities submit project applications for approval or renewal, [the researchers must
disclose] their financial interests in the private entities that sponsor their research." Helen
Leskovac, Tes That Bind Conflicts of Interest in University-Industry Links, 17 U.C. DAVis
L. REv. 895, 896 (1984).
119. See Lachs, supra note 93, at 289.
120. See Reichman, Applied Know-How, supra note 11, at 644.
121. See id at 646-47 (discussing how the Pajaro Dunes Statement, which was issued in
1982 by a prominent group of university presidents, assessed the potential risks of univer-
sity-industry collaboration and proposed possible solutions).
122. There is no evidence that professors at the University of Minnesota or the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, two universities that generally allow faculty to retain full patent rights in
faculty inventions, have more conflict-of-interest problems than professors at other
universities.
123. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Access by Foreign Corporations to Federally-Funded Research, Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Science of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Tech-
nology, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1993) (reprinting Ass'N OF UNIV. LICENSrNG TECHNOL-
OGY MANAGERS (AUTM), LICENSNG SURVEY) [hereinafter House Hearings, 1993]. This
amount does not include royalties from copyrighted works created by professors and




nue. But many professors do not have the time, the inclination, or the
training to market their creations themselves.125 Thus, in a competi-
tive market, university technology transfer offices ("TrOs") would
still keep much of their present business of licensing and/or selling
professors' creations. 126
The model for this new breed of TTO is the University of Wis-
consin Alumni Research Foundation ("WARF"). Since its creation in
1925, WARF has made roughly $50 million for the University of Wis-
consin ("UW").127 UW allows its professors to own the IP fights to
their creations,128 so WARF must compete for the right to market
professors' inventions 129 with private technology transfer companies
and private companies interested in licensing specific inventions. 30
Most UW professors who have patentable inventions go through
WARF to market their inventions even though they are not required
to do So.131 In short, WARF has competed very well.
If other universities implemented the WARF model, they would
inevitably lose some revenue because some professors would not use
university TTOs.132 However, this assumes a new IP regime would
125. A notable exception is Stephen Wolfram, who enjoys "making deals." See Siler et
al., supra note 11, at 90; infra Part III.B.2.
126. TTOs handle all aspects of university-to-industry technology transfer. First, they
have staff attorneys who write the patents on faculty inventions. Then they solicit compa-
nies through presentations and symposia to license or buy these inventions. Finally, they
negotiate the contract between the university and the company. All the while, the TTO
staff keeps in contact with the inventing professor, keeping tabs on the status of the inven-
tion. See M.I.T POLICY, supra note 103, at 21.
127. See University/Industry Cooperation in Biotechnology: Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Tech-
nology of the House Comm. of Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 219-20, 230
(1982) (reprinting THE WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, A STORY OF DEDI-
CATION) [hereinafter House Hearings, 1982]. The most famous (and profitable) WARF
inventions are the irradiation process used to add Vitamin D to milk and bread, and warfa-
rin, a famous rat poison. Id. at 219-20.
128. See supra note 80.
129. WARF does not market copyrightable works. See House Hearings, 1982, supra
note 127, at 239. However, the proposed TTO in this Note would market copyrightable
works as well. See infra Part IV.
130. See House Hearings, 1982, supra note 127, at 220 ("[T]hese inventions have been
assigned to the foundation voluntarily."); David Blumenthal et al., Commercializing Uni-
versity Research: Lessons from the Experience of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Founda-
tion, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1621, 1622 (1986) (mentioning that WARF actively seeks out
inventions and makes advertising presentations to professors); Linda Williams, Academia
Wises Up on Patents, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1990, at Al (describing some private technology
transfer offices).
131. Blumenthal, supra note 130, at 1624.
132. Almost every other university TTO has a monopoly on licensing faculty inven-
tions because the university owns the invention. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
If professors had full IP rights in their creations, some professors would probably abandon
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have no influence on faculty creativeness, which is not true.133 The
number of licenses granted or creations sold by the university TTO
may well increase because the volume of total faculty creations would
increase, and TIOs would capture much of this growth.134 Also, these
new TTOs would market a new class of creations-copyrightable
works.' 35
Will these factors fully offset any loss? Without empirical evi-
dence, it is difficult to say, but these factors would certainly have a
large effect. In addition, royalty income is a bare 1.3% of total univer-
sity research funding, 36 so a relatively small drop in income would not
imperil the survival of university research. Therefore, the "loss of rev-
enue" argument universities make in defending present-day IP poli-
cies has serious flaws. Even if there were a small decrease in funding,
the benefits to universities from granting full IP rights to professors
would outweigh this loss, as explained in Part III.B.
(4) Bayh-Dole Act' 3 7
Universities claim federal law requires them to own all faculty
creations. 38 However, that claim is very misleading. The Bayh-Dole
Act "allows universities, small businesses and non-profit organizations
to patent the results of government-funded research and license such
inventions to industry.' 39 There are four steps that the Bayh-Dole
Act contemplates:
their university TO, as evidenced by UW's experience. See supra text accompanying note
131.
133. See infra Part H.B.3. for the argument that the new IP regime will increase the
number of faculty creations.
134. See infra Part M.B.3.
135. See infra Part IV. Some technologically oriented copyrightable works (computer
software, for instance) are already being handled by some university 'TTOs. See, eg.,
CALTE H PoLcCY, supra note 76, ch. 7, at 6 (claiming software for the university); M.I.T.
POLICY, supra note 103, at 16 (same). However, this practice is not commonplace. See
supra note 90 and accompanying text.
The "TO proposed by this Note will also handle less technological copyrightable
works, such as teaching aids or even books. Most professors who write books will continue
to deal with publishers directly, but for other types of copyrightable works, they may use
the TTO to find a willing licensee, especially if the professors are not interested in dealing
with the business side of creation. This new stream of revenue may offset some of the
inevitable losses the TTO will face by losing its monopoly over IP transfer.
136. See House Hearings, 1993, supra note 124, at 80 ($13.0 billion in total sponsored
funding and $172.7 million in royalty income).
137. The Bayh-Dole Act is the popular name for the Patent and Trademark Law
Amendment Act of 1980 and is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
138. See Chew, supra note 9, at 293.
139. Senate Holds Hearings on Bayh-Dole Act, 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 38 (1994).
"Prior to the enactment of this law [in 1980], rights to those inventions were either assigned
to the funding agency or dedicated to the public through publication of the research re-
sults." Id.; see also Lachs, supra note 93, at 268. If the government owned the patent rights,
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1. The inventor (typically a professor or other university re-
searcher) reports to the university any patentable invention. The
university must then disclose the existence of the patentable inven-
tion to the federal sponsoring agency "within a reasonable time.
140
2. The university has the opportunity to claim title to the invention
assuming the university files a patent application in a timely
fashion.
141
3. If the university declines to claim title to the invention, then the
federal government may claim title.142
4. If the government does not claim title (and it claims title infre-
quently), 143 then the inventor can request rights in the invention.
44
However, the Act has limited scope. The Act only applies when
specific funding agreements are made with federal agencies. 145 Re-
search done using unrestricted university or industry-provided money
is excluded by the Act.146 Copyrightable works are also not covered
it would disseminate this knowledge through nonexclusive licensing. The results were very
discouraging-"less than four percent of the 28,000 patents held were developed."
Congress remedied this problem through the Act, which allows universities and small
businesses to keep patents developed with federal funds. Id. at 267. By almost all accounts
the Act has proved to be very effective. See House Hearings, 1993, supra note 124, at 62-63
(detailing how much one university, the University of Florida, benefited from the Act); id.
at 80 (revealing that in fiscal year 1992, universities filed roughly 2,300 patent applications,
granted almost 1,400 licenses to industry, and received royalty revenues of approximately
$172.7 million).
For more details on the Act, including discussions of how licensees must agree to
manufacture substantial portions of licensed inventions in the United States and of how
the Act affects small businesses, see Edward C. Walterschied, The Need for a Uniform
Government Patent Policy: The D.O.E. Example, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 131 (Spring
1990), and William L. Geary, Jr., Protecting the Patent Rights of Small Businesses-Does
the Bayh-Dole Act Live Up to Its Promise, 20 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N Q.J. 10 (1992).
140. 35 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1988). In this context, the university is usually the "contractor"
under the Act because the university is one party to the funding agreement with the fed-
eral sponsoring agency. See id.; infra note 145 and accompanying text. Inventors do not
have to report creations that they believe to be unpatentable. Chew, supra note 9, at 294
n.142.
141. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (allowing universities to claim title to inventions if certain
requirements are met); id. § 202(c)(3) (requiring universities to promptly file a patent ap-
plication); id. § 201(i) (including universities under the definition of "nonprofit
organization").
142. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (providing that if the university does not claim title, the
federal government "may receive title to any subject invention").
143. Presumably, if the university does not want title to the invention, it is not worth
having. See Chew, supra note 9, at 294.
144. 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (1988).
145. See 35 U.S.C § 202(c) (1988) (requiring a funding agreement to apply the Act).
146. See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1988) ("It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use
the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported
research or development.") (emphasis added). Industry-academia agreements usually have
their own allocation of rights. See Colburn, supra note 11, at Z10 (discussing the need for
complicated agreements to allocate rights between universities and industrial partners).
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by the Act.147 Thus, the Act does not require universities to make a
blanket claim of ownership to all faculty creations; at most, universi-
ties may claim title to federally funded patentable inventions.
148
B. Why Professors Should Own IP Rights in Their Creations
There are three main reasons why professors and not universities
should own the IP rights in professors' creations:
1. All genres of faculty creation should receive equal treatment.
Professors who create patentable inventions should be treated the
same as professors who create copyrightable works because compa-
rable talent and dedication are required for both types of creation.
2. Giving professors full rights in their creations is a form of "soft
compensation," which is especially important for public universities
struggling to retain faculty.
3. A greater number of socially useful works will be created be-
cause professors will have greater incentive to create such works.
(1) All Genres of Creation are Equal
As discussed in Part I, most universities treat particular genres of
faculty creation differently: all rights in copyrightable works are kept
by professors, but rights in patentable inventions are assigned to the
university. Since technical professors produce inventions, this dispar-
ity hits them especially hard. This disparity is based on outmoded no-
tions of who "true professors" are and what those professors do and is
hence unjustifiable. Such notions may lead to interdisciplinary resent-
ment, which is hardly a desirable result.
Traditionally, "professors" were liberal arts professors or theoret-
ical science professors-Sir Isaac Newton, for example.149 There was a
strong common-law tradition that professors owned the work they
However, this Note does not address the proper allocation of IP rights between industry
and academia and the resulting conflict-of-interest problems.
147. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (explaining the scope of the Bayh-Dole Act in terms of
"subject invention"); id. § 201(e) (defining "subject invention" in terms of "invention"); id-
§ 201(d) (defining "invention" as a patentable invention or a plant variety protected by the
Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1988)).
148. It is true that a large percentage of faculty inventions are subject to the Bayh-Dole
Act because they are federally funded. See, e.g., Hoskins Letter, supra note 113 (over 90%
of all inventions disclosed to the U.C. Berkeley TTO are federally funded and thus subject
to the Bayh-Dole Act). However, most universities do not receive the level of federal
funds that U.C. Berkeley does, so they have correspondingly fewer inventions subject to
the Bayh-Dole Act. See Chew, supra note 9, at 297 (stating that in 1989 only 59% of re-
search funding for all universities came from the federal government).
But even if the university claims title to an invention, it does not have to retain title-it
can assign it back to the inventor, and all the benefits of faculty ownership can then accrue.
See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
149. See RicHARtuD D. MANDELL, THm PROFESSOR GAME 18-19 (1977) (stating that
practical studies were not a part of the university's traditional role).
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produced: "This has been the academic tradition since copyright law
began. ' 150 Since there were few "practical" professors at the time this
common law developed, professors were and indeed still are strongly
associated with books and academic articles, not inventions.15' When
technical professors began creating patentable inventions and receiv-
ing patents, many saw this as a derogation of an academic's core func-
tions of performing pure research and publishing.
152
Why were professors traditionally allowed to own and control
their work? First, professors are best equipped to disseminate their
knowledge to society.153 Second, control by the university over profes-
sors' work would damage the ideals of academic freedom. For exam-
ple, universities could suppress unpopular ideas if universities owned
the work that contained the ideas.154 However, these same conse-
quences are true for technical professors who invent. Professors dis-
seminate much knowledge through their inventions, especially when
the inventions are made public after the patent has issued. 55 Profes-
sors are well-equipped to disseminate their inventions to private firms
because they, not faceless university bureaucrats, know their field of
research intimately. 56 Also, when universities control faculty inven-
tions, they interfere with this mode of disseminating ideas, which
threatens academic freedom. 57 Thus, the reasons supporting the tra-
150. Weinstein v. University of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987); see Hays v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[V]irtually no one questioned that
the academic author was entitled to copyright his writings."). For more discussion on this
point, see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
151. In addition, teaching is a big part (the biggest part at non-research universities) of
a professor's workload. See MARTIN J. FINKELSTEIN, THE AMERICAN ACADEMIC PROFES-
SION: A SYNTHESIS OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 87 (1984);
HERBERT LIVESEY, THE PROFESSORS 45 (1975).
152. Historically, university professors did not seek to patent their research results be-
cause patenting was thought to corrupt the academic mission. See supra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text.
153. Hays, 847 F.2d at 416 (noting that universities also are poorly equipped to dis-
tribute a professor's work).
154. Cf. Lape, supra note 42, at 261-62 (showing how some universities do not claim
copyright in traditional scholarly works, thus demonstrating their commitment to "aca-
demic freedom").
155. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 10-13 (1988) (detailing ways the Patent and Trademark Office
makes patents available to the public). In addition, because publishing articles is part of a
professor's duties, technical professors publish articles detailing their patentable inven-
tions. Under American patent law, an inventor may publish details of her invention and
not forego the right to patent the invention, provided that the patent application was filed
within one year of the publication. See id. § 102(b).
156. Of course, if professors do not want to spend time dealing with licensing issues,
they can permit university technology transfer offices to handle their inventions. The point
is that universities are not necessarily better able to license inventions than professors.
157. Valuable academic ideas can be expressed through inventions and accompanying
patent applications as well as through the more traditional route of scholarly articles.
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dition of professors owning their copyrightable works also support
professors owning their patentable inventions.
If equal treatment is not forthcoming, resentment among those
receiving different treatment is inevitable. Liberal arts professors may
retain the copyright in their musical compositions, while technical
professors must give up the patent rights on their newly-created chem-
ical processes. 158 With the advent of computer software, this resent-
ment has been exacerbated. Software is a "practical" creation, but at
most universities it is treated as just another copyrightable work,
which allows "technical" professors who create software to retain full
rights in their work, unlike technical professors who create patentable
inventions. 159 Having a special policy for software, 60 however, would
not solve the central problem: inequality by genre and across disci-
plines in the treatment of faculty creations. 16' This inequality fuels in-
terdisciplinary conflicts, harms university morale, and detracts from
the academic tradition more than would allowing professors to own
the patent rights in their inventions. 62
Moral equity demands that liberal arts and technical professors
be treated equally with respect to the ownership of their creations. All
professors are "true professors," and on a moral level, all genres of
faculty creation should be valued equally.163 However, universities
158. Technical professors may benefit from the present university copyright policy by
publishing their research. A more accurate classification would distinguish "inventive
professors" from "noninventive professors." However, most technical professors have op-
portunities to invent, and for all practical purposes, only technical professors can invent, so
for ease of description in this Note, "technical" is equated with "inventive."
159. See supra note 85. Computer software in some circumstances may be patented,
but that is not the usual mode of IP protection. See supra note 8.
160. Some universities do have special IP policies for software. See supra note 85.
161. Universities may claim that the supposedly higher revenues available for patenta-
ble inventions would corrupt faculty and provide revenue to universities. However, as ex-
plained in Part I.A, faculty corruption due to ownership of patents is unlikely; other
factors (such as competition with other professors) probably play a much bigger role in
causing corruption. Additionally, if professors owned IP rights in all types of creations, the
production of these creations would increase, and many, if not most, of these new creations
will be handled through the campus TrO. Thus, universities may end up making more
money under this new regime. See supra Part III.A.3.
In addition, treating faculty creations equally regardless of genre does not mean that
within a particular genre, objective evaluations of merit cannot be made. See supra note 14.
162. See Reichman, Overlapping Rights, supra note 10, at 81.
163. But see generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV.
537 (1982) (stating that since no two things are truly alike and therefore do not deserve
equal treatment, equality is "an empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its
own"). This argument, however, has met fiery responses. See Kent Greenawalt, How
Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 CoLuM. L. REv. 1167 (1983); Erwin Chemerinsky, In
Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 575 (1983). This Note
assumes that equality is important because "the equality notion at least creates a strong
legal-moral presumption in favor of equal treatment ... , departures from which must be
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could claim all rights in faculty creations (books and inventions alike),
and this would constitute equal treatment as well. Nevertheless, the
tradition of professors owning their copyrightable works is strong to-
day, even in the face of ambiguous statutory language. 164 Since the
moral reasons underlying this tradition apply equally to patentable in-
ventions, the tradition should be broadened to include patentable
inventions.
(2) "Soft Compensation"
Offering professors complete IP rights in their creations will help
universities retain talented faculty.165 Public universities are particu-
larly vulnerable because they are generally unable to pay competitive
wages as compared to both industry and private universities because
of budget cuts over the last decade or So. 1 6 6 Universities have special
problems keeping professors in the health sciences and engineering
disciplines because private companies, as well as other universities,
are competitors. 67 Especially in biotechnology, the gap between the-
ory and practice is vanishingly small, so the usual disdain by academ-
ics for practical applications is not present. Industry-academia
interaction is commonplace, 168 and biotech professors often leave for
private practice to do much the same work they did at their
universities. 69
justified." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 607 (12th ed. 1991). Part III.A con-
tended that universities' justifications for unequal treatment are not justified, and so all
genres of faculty creations should be treated equally.
164. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines "work-for-hire" very broadly. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 para. 40 (1994). Some commentators believe it encompasses faculty-created
copyrightable works, but judges, treatise-writers, and other commentators disagree. See
supra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
165. See Chew, supra note 9, at 284.
166. See Gordon, supra note 19, at A23; Lisa Lapin, Budget-Driven Early Retirements
Pare UC Faculty, Staff, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 8, 1993, at B1 (discussing how early retire-
ments are devastating the University of California system).
167. See Chew, supra note 9, at 284-85 & n.95.
168. This rapid transition from theory to practice in the biotechnology area has
prompted many industry-academia research collaborations. See, e.g., House Hearings,
1982, supra note 127, at 13-19 (statement by Dr. David M. Kipnis, Professor and Head of
Internal Medicine at Washington University, St. Louis) (discussing the $23.5 million deal
Washington University inked with Monsanto Co.); Malcolm Gladwell, Johns Hopkins
Forming Firm to Help Sell Results of Invention, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1988, at F5, F6
(listing several industry-academia partnerships, including the Washington-Monsanto
linkup).
169. See, e.g., Activated Cell Therapy Announces New Executive Management Team,
Business Wire, Aug. 30, 1995, available in Westlaw, USNEWS database (reporting that
company's new chief executive officer was formerly a professor at the University of Wash-
ington and company's new vice-president is currently a professor at Stanford University);
Sonni Efron, UCI Researcher, Firm Join in Alzheimer's Fight Medicine: A San Diego Com-
pany Will Support Studies Aimed at Developing a Clinical Test for the Disease, L.A. TIMES
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The prospect of controlling the exploitation of one's work will
induce professors to stay in academia and tolerate the lower pay
academia offers.170 Most professors are realistic-they realize that few
of their projects will make any appreciable money.171 This situation is
true for technical and liberal arts professors alike. However, since the
potential rewards are so great,172 the incentive still remains.173
In 1979, the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) learned
the hard way that not giving professors ownership of their creations
can drive brilliant minds away. Stephen Wolfram, a theoretical physi-
cist, created a computer program to calculate quantum field theory
diagrams (also known as Feynman diagrams).1 74 Caltech claimed that
it owned the copyright in the program and attempted to wrest control
of it away from Wolfram, who wanted to distribute it cheaply to fellow
scientists.1 75 The resulting dispute precipitated Wolfram's departure
from Caltech.1
76
(Orange County ed.), Sept. 17, 1991, at D1 (reporting that researcher formerly at a univer-
sity laboratory moved to a private company; now the laboratory and company are collabo-
rating on a research venture).
170. For instance, the University of California, Los Angeles ("UCLA"), tried to retain
a distinguished professor of surgery by giving him the rights to his pioneering tissue-typing
invention. Elaine Woo, Professor's Conflict-of-interest Case Raises Broader Questions, L.A.
TIMiEs, July 31, 1987, at A3. However, this triggered quite a controversy because UCLA's
actions allegedly violated many state regulations. ld. at A26. Under a regime where profes-
sors owned their inventions, which is the proposal this Note espouses, no such violations
would have occurred.
171. See Henrik D. Parker, Note, Reform for Rights of Employed Inventors, 57 S. CAL.
L. REv. 603, 604 (asserting that only 1 out of every 100 inventions will be "economically
viable"). Most projects done by technical professors do not even generate patentable in-
ventions but rather generate discoveries in pure science or result in unpatentable techno-
logical know-how. See Reichman, Applied Know-How, supra note 11, at 652 (discussing
how most of the enormous investment of time and effort in the field of biotechnology is not
patentable).
172. For example, Charles Boyer, a former University of California, San Francisco
(UCSF) professor who co-founded Genentech, recently donated $24 million to UCSF. See
Biochemist Gives $24 Million to UC San Francisco, L.A. TrMms, Apr. 29, 1994, at A33. His
donation came from royalties generated by the gene-splicing process he and Stanley N.
Cohen, a Stanford University professor, created in the 1970's. Id. This process is the foun-
dation of the modern biotechnology industry. Id.
173. This conclusion varies in accuracy for different fields. An art history professor
probably has fewer opportunities to leave academia than an electrical engineering profes-
sor-fewer openings exist in private art galleries than in computer companies. Perhaps for
the art history professor, granting full IP rights to professors is an unnecessary incentive to
stay in academia. However, most schools grant full rights in copyrightable works to profes-
sors anyway, so the status quo for the art history professor would not change. On the other
hand, if the professor is able to retain IP rights in her creations, she has a powerful incen-
tive to remain on campus.
174. Dreyfuss, supra note 81, at 616; G.A. Taubes, Physics Whiz Goes into Biz, FOR-
TuNE, Apr. 11, 1988, at 90.
175. Dreyfuss, supra note 81, at 616.
176. Id.
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As a result of his experience with Caltech, Wolfram placed an
important condition on any new employer: he, not his new employer,
would own the copyrights in any computer programs that he cre-
ated.177 The University of Illinois ("Illinois") agreed to this condition
and hired him.178 Wolfram promptly created Mathematica, a much
more advanced version of his original program and now a very popu-
lar mathematical modeling program for personal computers. Conse-
quently, Wolfram is a very wealthy man, Illinois received favorable
recognition for having Wolfram as an affiliated professor, and Caltech
was left out in the cold, making little money selling Wolfram's original
program, which lacked Wolfram's proposed improvements. 179
Even though Wolfram did not want to profit from his original
creation, he needed ownership rights to control the program's dissem-
ination and use; not having these rights caused him to leave. Wolf-
ram's story is perhaps more spectacular than most, but many
professors do leave for greener pastures-either to private industry or
more hospitable universities. 18 0 Allowing faculty to own the IP rights
in their creations is a step universities should take to retain their
professors, the heart of any university.' 8 '
(3) More Creations Will Be Produced
If professors had full IP rights in their creations, more works
would be produced. Even if this proposition is true, is producing more
works desirable for society? The answer is yes.
A fundamental tenet of American IP law is that IP protection
acts as a financial incentive for further creation. 82 This tenet proves
its truth in many ways. Countries that have statutory schemes for com-
pensating employed inventors'8 3 have the highest rate of patent appli-
177. Siler et al., supra note 11, at 92.
178. Id.
179. Dreyfuss, supra note 81, at 616; Siler et al., supra note 11, at 95; Taubes, supra
note 174, at 92.
180. See Siler et al., supra note 11, at 90 (profiling many professors who leave academia
for private industry).
181. "When Dwight Eisenhower became president of Columbia University, he met
with the faculty, which he labeled 'the employees of Columbia.' According to academic
legend, a distinguished senior professor corrected him by saying, 'General, we are not em-
ployees of Columbia University. We are Columbia University."' JULIUS GETMAN, IN THE
COMPANY OF SCHOLARS: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF HIGHER EDUCATION 90
(1992).
182. The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize "are [not] primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which
an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activ-
ity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward .... " Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
183. In the United States, which has no national statutory scheme, employees usually
must give or assign their inventions to their employers. See Parker, supra note 171, at 617.
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cations for domestically-created inventions. 184 When the University of
California system doubled the professor-inventor's royalty rate, a
"sharp and sustained increase occurred in the number of disclosures
of ideas."' 85 Among the top universities in patents awarded in 1988
were Stanford University, Harvard University, and the University of
Wisconsin, all of which allow their professors to retain patent fights in
their inventions. 86
With regard to copyrightable works, the majority of universities
do not claim copyright, so professors retain it.187 If more schools start
claiming works, output by professors is likely to decrease and will
likely shift away from the genre of works universities claim.188 Thus,
the looming presence of university ownership distorts the work pro-
duced by professors. 89 The example of Stephen Wolfram described in
Part III.B.2 illustrates that professors who have full ownership rights
will probably create more works than professors who have limited
rights. Thus, empirical evidence indicates that common sense is cor-
rect: granting more IP rights in creations promotes creation.
Granted, the production of more marketable creations does not
mean that society is necessarily better off. Nevertheless, universities
today are justly regarded as sources of technology transfer as well as
citadels of pure science. 90 Professors who write books for popular
Thus, these statutory schemes are an alternative form of compensation designed to reward
inventors.
184. See Parker, supra note 171, at 605 n.17. Switzerland, Sweden, and the former West
Germany ranked first, second, and third, respectively. The United States, which has no
such compensation scheme, ranked seventh. Id
185. Blumenthal, supra note 130, at 1625. The University of California doubled its roy-
alty rate from 25% to 50%. What would happen if it increased its royalty rate to 100%?
Part M.B.3 contends that even more idea disclosures would be submitted.
186. See Chew, supra note 9, at 284. The University of Wisconsin applies the policy
most favorable to faculty: professors may retain all patent rights except those claimed by a
funding sponsor. Wisc. PoLicy, supra note 80, at 2. Harvard allows its professors to retain
ownership in inventions that are not related to medical diagnostics or therapeutic to public
health. There is, however, a catch: if the inventing professor does not commercialize the
invention, Harvard will retake ownership. See supra note 80. Stanford changed its patent
policy in 1994. Now Stanford professors do not own their inventions-Stanford does. See
infra note 198.
187. See supra notes 81, 90, and accompanying text.
188. See Dreyfuss, supra note 81, at 612. In addition, universities may press for more
marketable works from a professor who wishes to pursue other interests.. This is not desir-
able because the author should decide when to write, not the employer. See id at 614.
189. See id. at 592-93.
190. See Chew, supra note 9, at 260-61 (stating that universities are a burgeoning
source of scientific breakthroughs); Lachs, supra note 93, at 268 ("It is properly the busi-
ness of the creative scholar to see to it that, if possible, his ideas serve mankind in his own
generation."') (quoting YandaIl Henderson of Yale University); Williams, supra note 130,
at Al ("Technology transfer-the process of getting ideas from lab to markets-has be-
come an integral part of the academic consciousness.").
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audiences do a valuable service, as do professors who labor in the
realm of abstract theory. 191 In fact, the "best" professors often com-
bine elements of theory and practicality in their careers.
192
In the end, the incentive of full IP rights will be enough to shift
the focus of some professors toward marketable works, and more
works will be produced. Society will benefit from increased produc-
tion of these works. Other professors will continue to devote them-
selves to theory, which is fine as well. The key is that there will be
adequate rewards for market-oriented creations as well as theoretical
creations. 193
C. Summary
The rationales offered by universities to justify ownership of
faculty creations are unsatisfactory. By contrast, as previously de-
scribed, solid reasons exist why professors should own the fruits of
their labor. The next Part discusses in detail a proposal that allows
faculty to own the IP rights in their own creations.
IV. A Proposal
As foreshadowed above, this proposal to reform the university IP
system has four components:
1. All faculty creations will be treated equally: copyrightable
works (including computer software), patentable inventions, and
technological "know-how" that may not qualify for patent or copy-
right protection.
2. The professors who produce these creations will own all intel-
lectual property rights in the creations. The only right the university
will have is a shop right to use the creation for university
purposes.194
3. Universities will revamp their existing TTOs along the lines of
WARF, the very successful University of Wisconsin To, to market
inventions or copyrightable works that professors voluntarily assign
191. See Bok, supra note 14, at 151-53.
192. Charles Boyer, the UCSF professor who co-invented the gene-splicing process
currently used in all modern biotechnology, is an example: he won a Nobel Prize for his
work and sowed the seeds for a new industry. See supra note 172. Another example is
Professor Daniel Koshland of U.C. Berkeley. In addition to his work with the Manhattan
Project and his revolutionary work in chemistry, he is also editor of Science magazine. See
Russell Schoch, California Q & A: A Conversation with Daniel E. Koshland Jr., CAL.
MONTHLY, Dec. 1991, at 44-49; see also BOK, supra note 14, at 151-68.
193. In the university setting, status is often measured by beating one's "competitors"
through publication of path-breaking articles in leading scholarly journals. See Eisenberg,
supra note 116, at 183-84. This is one well-established road to success; by granting full IP
rights, we will have created another road. A professor can follow one or the other or both,
but at least now there will be sufficient prizes at the ends of both roads.
194. This simply codifies existing common law principles. See supra Part I.
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to the university. 195 Professors will have the choice between negoti-
ating with the ITO to license their creations or handling the licens-
ing chores themselves, thus bypassing the TTO. The TITO will be
funded from a percentage of the overall royalties earned by faculty
creations.
196
4. For federally-funded inventions, the university should elect to
take title under the Bayh-Dole Act. Then the university would reas-
sign the invention back to the professor for nominal consideration;
from that point, the invention would be treated like any other
faculty-created invention.
197
These provisions should be explicit in this new university IP pol-
icy. 198 The policy should be signed by professors as a prerequisite to
195. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text. Notice that WARF does not han-
dle copyrightable works, but this new TTO would handle all types of copyrightable works,
even non-technological works.
196. This is how many university TTOs are funded currently. See, e.g., CALrECH PoL-
icy, supra note 76, ch. 7, at 5 (patent licensing and administration costs are paid through
royalties); BERKELEY PoLIcY, supra note 77, at 1 (15% of gross royalties applied to admin-
istrative costs of the TTO); M.I.T. POLICY, supra note 103, at 19 (same).
197. The Act does not forbid such an arrangement. See Chew, supra note 9, at 294-96;
supra Part III.B.4.
There is no equivalent to the Bayh-Dole Act for federally-funded copyrightable
works, but the enabling legislation of certain federal programs has provisions dealing with
the ownership of copyrightable works produced in part through federal money. See, eg., 15
C.F.R. § 290.9 (1990) (dealing with copyrightable works, including computer software, cre-
ated at the Regional Centers for the Transfer of Manufacturing Technology, which are
university-government collaborations). A professor who creates a work at the Regional
Center may claim copyright in the work, provided that in the work she acknowledges gov-
ernment sponsorship. Id. She must also give the government a permanent shop right in the
work. L In this example, no special steps must be taken to comport with the proposal
described in this Note.
In general, however, absent a provision like 15 C.F.R. § 290.9, the fact that the govern-
ment provided the funding for the research has no relevance to ownership of the copyright.
Thus, if a professor uses a federal grant to write a book, the government has no claim to
the copyright.
198. Implementing this new IP regime through a vote of the Faculty Senate or
equivalent governing body of professors seems to be the usual method. Cf Appeal of
Keene State College Educ. Ass'n, NHEA/NEA, 411 A.2d 156, 160 (N.H. 1980) (discussing
how faculty committees "dealing with curriculum... or research topics" are acceptable but
that "conditions of employment such as pay and hours" are subjects of union bargaining).
However, "[faculty committees, like the Faculty Senate] are not intended nor do they have
the power to enter into binding agreements on behalf of faculty." Id. Implementing a new
IP policy would seem not to be within the power of the Faculty Senate but rather a subject
for collective bargaining. This particular issue, however, has not yet been litigated. For a
general discussion of collective bargaining among university professors, see GEORGE W.
ANGELL ET AL., HANDBOOK OF FACULTY BARGAINING: AssERTING ADMINIsTRATIVE
LEADERSHIP FOR INsTrUTIONAL PROGREss BY PREPARING FOR BARGAINING, NEGOTIAT-
ING AND ADMINISTRATING CoNTRACrS, AND IMIPRovING THE BARGAINING PROCESS
(1977).
Stanford University recently changed its IP policy by a vote of its faculty. It had previ-
ously allowed its professors to own all rights in their patentable inventions, but on April 14,
1994, the Stanford faculty voted to join the mainstream and implement mandatory assign-
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employment, as opposed to being hidden in a faculty handbook. 199
Only professors, graduate students who may be co-creators with their
professors,200 and research scientists employed by the university
should be eligible for this new IP policy. University staff employees
need not be covered under this policy-as these employees are un-
likely to create, the extra incentive provided by this new IP policy is
unnecessary.
201
University20 2 TTOs could implement this new policy relatively
easily. TTOs could keep most of their present personnel in place
under this new regime. However, T-Os would need to add a few peo-
ple skilled in licensing and marketing non-technological copyrightable
works. 20 3 A more subtle yet more far-reaching change needed in these
TI'Os would be one of attitude. Currently, most TTOs have monopoly
status-professors must license their creations through their campus
TTO because the university owns the creation.2°4 If professors are dis-
satisfied with their TrO's performance,20 5 they have no alternative ex-
ment of patentable inventions to the university. Bill Workman, Conflict Policy Ok'd by
Faculty at Stanford, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 15, 1994, at A19.
199. See University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1224 n.14 (E.D. Pa.
1991); e.g., U.C. POLICY, supra note 76, at 2 (requiring every employee to sign its patent
policy as part of the hiring process).
200. When faculty creations are produced with contributions by graduate assistants,
some sort of co-ownership of the IP rights is necessary. See supra note 48 (joint authorship
of copyrightable works) and note 58 (joint inventorship of patentable inventions).
201. The purpose of this new IP policy is to change professors' research patterns
through increased financial incentives. However, this presupposes that professors can tailor
their research toward fields that will produce marketable creations. Staff employees have
much less freedom in their work, so any incentive to create provided by this new IP policy
will not significantly affect their creative behavior. Any creation by staff employees will
occur by happenstance as they are not trained to create, and financial incentives cannot
affect fate.
202. Lachs suggests an independent patent management agency to handle these func-
tions instead of a TTO controlled by or affiliated with the university. Lachs, supra note 93,
at 282-85. That solution works best for small colleges, where there are few marketable
creations and the expertise to effectively license and market them is lacking. See id. at 282-
83. However, at large research universities with active university TTOs in place, there is no
need to jettison the expertise present in these T1Os. Implementing Lachs' suggestions at
these universities would work a dramatic upheaval in university life with uncertain benefit.
203. Most university TI'Os, even if the university has a copyright policy, presently do
not handle nontechnological works such as books and scholarly articles. See supra note
135.
204. See supra note 78.
205. In February 1995, two former University of California, San Francisco professors
sued the University of California Office of Technology Transfer ("OTT"), claiming that the
OTT bungled the licensing agreement concerning the professors' invention. Lance Wil-
liams, Suit Says UC Blew Patent Deal: Scientists: Rights to Medical Technology All But
Given Away, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 12, 1995, at Dl. The invention was the use of a chemical
compound that, when added to blood and analyzed by a Magnetic Resonance Imaging
("MRI") scanner, provided images of blood flow useful in predicting strokes and heart
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cept perhaps to "hide" their creation from the TLO and market it
independently, which would be a breach of contract. 206 Under this
new regime, TTOs would have to sell professors on their services in a
competitive market.207 Making this transition from monopoly to com-
petitive player might be difficult in the short run, but soon after the
changeover, TTOs around the country would effectively compete for
business and keep royalty revenues flowing into their universities.20 8
Conclusion
Before ending this Note, we should revisit State U.209 If this pro-
posal were implemented there, engineering professor A (who created
a better mousetrap), history professor B (who wrote a nonfiction best-
seller), and computer science professor C (who wrote a computer pro-
gram) would all be treated in the same manner-all three would own
their IP rights in their creations outright. A, B, and C would be free to
assign their creations to the new and improved State U. Technology
Transfer Office voluntarily while negotiating their own royalties. Al-
ternatively, they could strike out on their own to market their cre-
attacks. Id. The professors claimed that the OTr sold the invention to a Norwegian firm
for $12,500 when previously, both U.C. and the Norwegian firm thought the invention was
worth up to $4.7 billion over the patent's 17-year life. Id at D3. Under the IP policy at
U.C., the professors had no choice but to use the OTT. See U.C. PoLicy, supra note 76, at
1.
206. What about "hiding" inventions? The most famous case of "hiding" occurred a
few years ago. In 1967, University of Pennsylvania ("Penn") dermatology professor Albert
Kligman invented Retin-A, a chemical compound used to treat acne. At the time, he
donated all his royalties to Penn, which made $15 million from the invention. Penn Settles
Patent Suits on Retin-A, Pare. INOUmER, Mar. 6, 1992, at B6. In the early 1980s, it was
learned that Retin-A had great potential as an antiwrinkle cream. Penn sued Kligman in
1990 because he had allegedly filed for a patent on this new use of Retin-A in 1981 and had
sold these patent rights to Johnson & Johnson ("J&J") without notifying Penn, the sup-
posed rightful owner of Retin-A. Id. After losing a motion for summary judgment (re-
ported as University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Pa. 1991)), J&J
settled the case in 1992 by paying Penn and its hired patent management firm royalties on
Retin-A while retaining the rights to the patent. Id.
In addition, this author knows professors and graduate students who have not re-
ported their creations to the university TrO but secretly marketed them anyway. Tele-
phone Interview with Graduate Student Smith (a pseudonym) (Feb. 1995).
207. Competition can arise in two ways. The first is from private patent management
firms that act like university 'ITOs as intermediaries between the professor and corpora-
tion. See Lachs, supra note 93, at 284-85. The second is from companies that want to license
the creation directly from the professor, meaning that no intermediary is involved. See, e.g.,
Wsc. PoLicy, supra note 80, at 5-6 (describing how professors may negotiate licensing
deals themselves); see also supra note 130 (describing how WARF sells UW professors on
its services).
208. Most professors will continue to use the campus ITO to license their creations.
See supra Part III.A3.
209. See supra Introduction.
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ations. Either way, the opportunity to own the IP rights in their
creations will encourage them to stay at State U. to produce more
creations beneficial to society.210
Thus, implementing this proposal would have the following ef-
fects: professors would have an increased incentive to create and
would produce more creations;21' universities would more easily re-
tain professors while losing little (if anything) in royalties;212 and soci-
ety would have more useful creations.21 3 But at bottom, this proposal
recognizes the undesirability and inability of ranking types of creation,
be they mousetraps, books, or software. The foreword to The Lord
God Made Them All, a book by the noted "legal" expert James Her-
riot,21 4 comes to mind:
All things bright and beautiful
All creatures great and small
All things wise and wonderful
The Lord God made them all.2 15
This sentiment of equality applies just as well to genres of faculty cre-
ations as it does to creatures in the animal kingdom.
210. See supra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
211. See supra Part III.B.3.
212. See supra Parts III.A.3, III.B.2.
213. See supra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
214. Of course, James Herriot was a famous British veterinarian-cum-author who
wrote about his experiences as a country veterinarian in the Yorkshire countryside. His
best-known book was All Creatures Great and Small Obituaries, James Herriot, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 24, 1995, at D4.
215. Cecil Frances Alexander, Foreword to JAMES HERRIOT, THE LORD GOD MADE
THEM ALL (1981).
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